Discussion:
[lopsa-discuss] sysadmin / infosec poll
Jan Schaumann
2014-12-03 15:42:41 UTC
Permalink
Hello,

I'm currently exploring the intersection of #sysadmin / #infosec[1] a
bit. There is obvious overlap, yet at many companies the two camps also
frequently end up at loggerheads. I'd like to collect some feedback:

What #infosec or (PCI) compliance mandates and rules drive you nuts?
What (seemingly or actually) pointless, braindead things are demanded of
you?[2]

On the flip side, what are some of the security related concepts or
fundamentals that you think junior sysadmins are frequently lacking or
having trouble understanding?[3]

Feel free to email me off-list, if you prefer. Alternatively, you can
also reply to the tweets referenced.

Thanks in advance!
-Jan

[1] https://twitter.com/jschauma/status/540153322670661632
[2] https://twitter.com/jschauma/status/539626083583541249
[3] https://twitter.com/jschauma/status/539918484663062529
John Broome
2014-12-03 15:50:07 UTC
Permalink
You realize hashtags don't work in email, right?
Post by Jan Schaumann
Hello,
I'm currently exploring the intersection of #sysadmin / #infosec[1] a
bit. There is obvious overlap, yet at many companies the two camps also
What #infosec or (PCI) compliance mandates and rules drive you nuts?
What (seemingly or actually) pointless, braindead things are demanded of
you?[2]
On the flip side, what are some of the security related concepts or
fundamentals that you think junior sysadmins are frequently lacking or
having trouble understanding?[3]
Feel free to email me off-list, if you prefer. Alternatively, you can
also reply to the tweets referenced.
Thanks in advance!
-Jan
[1] https://twitter.com/jschauma/status/540153322670661632
[2] https://twitter.com/jschauma/status/539626083583541249
[3] https://twitter.com/jschauma/status/539918484663062529
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Travis
2014-12-03 19:16:43 UTC
Permalink
John,

Instead of jumping on Jan for the use of hashtags in email, please consider
providing him useful and constructive
feedback.

Jan,

I'm curious how you're going to use the responses you're compiling? Just
something informal or will this be for publication/blog post somewhere?

Cheers,
Travis
Post by John Broome
You realize hashtags don't work in email, right?
Post by Jan Schaumann
Hello,
I'm currently exploring the intersection of #sysadmin / #infosec[1] a
bit. There is obvious overlap, yet at many companies the two camps also
What #infosec or (PCI) compliance mandates and rules drive you nuts?
What (seemingly or actually) pointless, braindead things are demanded of
you?[2]
On the flip side, what are some of the security related concepts or
fundamentals that you think junior sysadmins are frequently lacking or
having trouble understanding?[3]
Feel free to email me off-list, if you prefer. Alternatively, you can
also reply to the tweets referenced.
Thanks in advance!
-Jan
[1] https://twitter.com/jschauma/status/540153322670661632
[2] https://twitter.com/jschauma/status/539626083583541249
[3] https://twitter.com/jschauma/status/539918484663062529
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Jan Schaumann
2014-12-03 20:32:30 UTC
Permalink
Post by Travis
I'm curious how you're going to use the responses you're compiling? Just
something informal or will this be for publication/blog post somewhere?
This is related to a blog post I'm pondering. I'm trying to get more
diverse feedback on what areas require better understanding of each
other's responsibilities versus "just" better communication.

-Jan

P.S.: If I double-click the hasthag in MS-Word, it totally works!!1
Mark McCullough
2014-12-04 14:18:30 UTC
Permalink
As I have worked that precise area for most of my career, the overlap between security and sysadmin, I'm well aware of some of the perceived issues.

My biggest battle? The false belief that every improvement to security hurts usability and every improvement to usability hurts security. It is common in people who have been doing things long enough they should know better, rather than just the newer people. Kill that idea in both secadmin and sysadmin, and one can make progress.

The answer as far as I've found?

First half is a "Technical Gripe Session". A forum with no supervisors allowed where technical people can raise concerns about security both where they see gaps and where they see it as too onerous. Security also uses it to communicate problems they are trying to solve to beta test potential solutions. Invite a few key sysadmins, a few key app admins, and after they understand it really is a "no supervisors allowed", they tend to speak up.

The other half is to have people who live precisely in that overlap space, sysadmin skill required (senior level) who are also responsible for ensuring the OS security. They will often catch the security personnel doing dumb insecure things like wanting to install agents that permit arbitrary unlogged command execution as root by the security team (violates among other things PCI DSS 10.2.2, and also a couple clauses of requirement 8 of PCI). because stupid security vendors and scanning. They also can help educate less security conscious sysadmins about why that root owned httpd server is a bad idea.

Oh, worst PCI rule?

The rule that violates PCI: Requirement to lock or disable accounts after x failed login attempts. That's a remotely executable, no authentication required denial of service attack that is demonstrated over and over again. Since it is a known vulnerability, it must be remediated, per PCI.
Post by Jan Schaumann
Post by Travis
I'm curious how you're going to use the responses you're compiling? Just
something informal or will this be for publication/blog post somewhere?
This is related to a blog post I'm pondering. I'm trying to get more
diverse feedback on what areas require better understanding of each
other's responsibilities versus "just" better communication.
-Jan
P.S.: If I double-click the hasthag in MS-Word, it totally works!!1
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Jan Schaumann
2014-12-04 16:42:51 UTC
Permalink
Post by Mark McCullough
My biggest battle? The false belief that every improvement to
security hurts usability and every improvement to usability hurts
security. It is common in people who have been doing things long
enough they should know better, rather than just the newer people.
I think that's a very good and important point: the long-held beliefs by
(proudly grumpy) old-timers may well do more harm than any wide-eyed
naivete of junior people.

Also thanks for the rest of your feedback, which makes a lot of sense to
me.

-Jan
Tracy Reed
2014-12-19 09:56:47 UTC
Permalink
Post by Mark McCullough
The rule that violates PCI: Requirement to lock or disable accounts after x
failed login attempts. That's a remotely executable, no authentication
required denial of service attack that is demonstrated over and over again.
Since it is a known vulnerability, it must be remediated, per PCI.
You would be referring to Requirement 8.1.6: Limit repeated access attempts by
locking out the user ID after not more than six attempts.

This isn't a violation of PCI as PCI isn't concerned with data availability.
They would rather the data be unavailable or even destroyed than to have card
data leak. This is very much as opposed to something like HIPAA where data
availability is every bit as important as confidentiality. HIPAA beats the CIA
(Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) drum regularly whereas PCI only
cares about Confidentiality.
--
Tracy Reed
Mark McCullough
2014-12-19 13:02:30 UTC
Permalink
That's the insanity, PCI does require remediation of all known security vulnerabilities. PCI's own guidance does not make any such exception for DoS vulnerabilities. In the guidance on 6.2 which states for the reason why patching is so crucial, "a malicious individual can use these exploits to attack or disable a system, or gain access to sensitive data."

I've actually argued this point a few times with a QSA and the response was much better than initially expected. One still needs a compensating control, but the contradiction wasn't dismissed when it was explained.

Most people I work with take one of two approaches. Either they bend their heads through insane apologetics to try and defend the contradiction, or they laugh and agree, and we go on to solving real problems like users recording passwords in plain text files, or leaving them on sticky notes, or passwords even being allowed in the first place. (That's another rant of mine.)
Post by Tracy Reed
Post by Mark McCullough
The rule that violates PCI: Requirement to lock or disable accounts after x
failed login attempts. That's a remotely executable, no authentication
required denial of service attack that is demonstrated over and over again.
Since it is a known vulnerability, it must be remediated, per PCI.
You would be referring to Requirement 8.1.6: Limit repeated access attempts by
locking out the user ID after not more than six attempts.
This isn't a violation of PCI as PCI isn't concerned with data availability.
They would rather the data be unavailable or even destroyed than to have card
data leak. This is very much as opposed to something like HIPAA where data
availability is every bit as important as confidentiality. HIPAA beats the CIA
(Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) drum regularly whereas PCI only
cares about Confidentiality.
--
Tracy Reed
----
"The speed of communications is wondrous to behold. It is also true that
speed can multiply the distribution of information that we know to be
untrue." Edward R Murrow (1964)

Mark McCullough
***@gmail.com




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b***@merctech.com
2014-12-03 20:48:45 UTC
Permalink
In the message dated: Wed, 03 Dec 2014 15:32:30 -0500,
The pithy ruminations from Jan Schaumann on
<Re: [lopsa-discuss] sysadmin / infosec poll> were:
=> Travis <***@ghostar.org> wrote:
=>
=> > I'm curious how you're going to use the responses you're compiling? Just
=> > something informal or will this be for publication/blog post somewhere?

I'm curious as well.

=>
=> This is related to a blog post I'm pondering. I'm trying to get more
=> diverse feedback on what areas require better understanding of each
=> other's responsibilities versus "just" better communication.

That explanation might help improve the quality of responses...the inital
query seemed like it was worded in a way that would generate a lot of
annecdotes, with sysadmins complaining about inflexible infosec rules,
and infosec professionals complaining about cowboy sysadmins who violate
policies, but little new, quantitative, or useful content.

Of course, I hope I'm wrong and you're actually getting a lot of high
quality responses.

My feedback on the question -- and my issues with the infosec folks at
$WORK -- might best be delivered over an adult beverage. :)

=>
=> -Jan
=>
=> P.S.: If I double-click the hasthag in MS-Word, it totally works!!1

What's this "MS-Word" program? Is that some new MUA?

Hashtags don't work for me in nmh[1].

Mark

[1] The "New" Mail Handler, as opposed to the original MH from c1979-1997.
Hashtags definitely don't do anything in MH either.
http://www.nongnu.org/nmh/
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Doug Hughes
2014-12-04 03:31:43 UTC
Permalink
Post by Jan Schaumann
Hello,
I'm currently exploring the intersection of #sysadmin / #infosec[1] a
bit. There is obvious overlap, yet at many companies the two camps also
What #infosec or (PCI) compliance mandates and rules drive you nuts?
What (seemingly or actually) pointless, braindead things are demanded of
you?[2]
On the flip side, what are some of the security related concepts or
fundamentals that you think junior sysadmins are frequently lacking or
having trouble understanding?[3]
Feel free to email me off-list, if you prefer. Alternatively, you can
also reply to the tweets referenced.
Here's one (that, thankfully, I currently don't have to deal with).

Password policies that enforce very explicit lists of things like 1
this, 1 that, 1 the other, and maybe another one of something else that
also must be changed every 30 days. The results tend to be totally
counterproductive, and have been documented many times in relevant
literature, but somehow many organization still end up making the same
mistakes.

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Carolyn Rowland
2014-12-04 03:56:28 UTC
Permalink
I could point you to over zealous auditors trying to force implementation of USGCB (http://usgcb.nist.gov/usgcb_faq.html) and going line by line through the the NIST Special Publication 800-53 control catalog trying to find things you don't implement so they can ding you (what?! Your Linux auth isn't using FIPS 140-2 validated encryption?! Or how are you ensuring transmission integrity for everything?).[1]

Luckily those auditors don't have a long shelf life inside my org but they do exist and wreak havoc while they are active.

Carolyn

[1] Password policies are part of this. I'm waiting for the new Mac security folk to run into the case where some poor user gets auto-locked out because their password meets the org level rules for passwords but doesn't match the local Mac password enforcement (different requirements) which they just enabled in order to be thorough. :p


Sent using a mouse-sized keyboard with feigned autocorrect intelligence.
Post by Doug Hughes
Post by Jan Schaumann
Hello,
I'm currently exploring the intersection of #sysadmin / #infosec[1] a
bit. There is obvious overlap, yet at many companies the two camps also
What #infosec or (PCI) compliance mandates and rules drive you nuts?
What (seemingly or actually) pointless, braindead things are demanded of
you?[2]
On the flip side, what are some of the security related concepts or
fundamentals that you think junior sysadmins are frequently lacking or
having trouble understanding?[3]
Feel free to email me off-list, if you prefer. Alternatively, you can
also reply to the tweets referenced.
Here's one (that, thankfully, I currently don't have to deal with).
Password policies that enforce very explicit lists of things like 1 this, 1 that, 1 the other, and maybe another one of something else that also must be changed every 30 days. The results tend to be totally counterproductive, and have been documented many times in relevant literature, but somehow many organization still end up making the same mistakes.
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Jan Schaumann
2014-12-04 16:48:42 UTC
Permalink
Post by Doug Hughes
Password policies that enforce very explicit lists of things
On the topic of passwords: are the different aspects -- such as password
rotation, complexity, hashing algorithms, use of vs. non-password based
auth, SSO vs. different passwords for different things -- and the
threats they attempt to mitigate well understood by most system
administrators?

Do we teach junior sysadmins about these to a sufficient degree or is
this something they (have to) pick up along the way to becoming more
senior?

-Jan
Mark McCullough
2014-12-05 04:54:31 UTC
Permalink
I've met too many senior sysadmins who still espouse the same nonsense about authentication I've seen for years, and it's still wrong.

I'm conducting the security awareness training for $company right now and have a whole section on passwords. Here's the short version.

"People choose lousy passwords. People use personal data that they publish online to choose passwords, even those who should know better. InfoSec has made all kinds of crazy rules about passwords to try and make people choose less lousy passwords. Choosing good passwords is really hard, much harder than the rules suggest. Brute force cracking and dictionary attacks are making the minimum length longer all the time. Don't play the game. Get out of the memorized password chosen by humans business."

That kind of security awareness training isn't natural, and sysadmins don't tend to teach it in my experience. If anything, most sysadmins I've worked with who weren't in operational security (which is what one job called the crossover between operational sysadmin and security) did their best to teach new sysadmins the worst habits like reusing passwords, choosing simple passwords "so that they are easy to remember", trying to insist on sharing of personal passwords, etc.

That's why sysadmins shouldn't just cringe and get upset when the secadmin says that security awareness training is needed for everyone.

Security is sufficiently specialized that no sysadmin can be expected to know more than the basics. But I often see that the basics themselves are not understood.

I've seen bad security, but others here have given plenty of stories there, so I feel no need to point out some of the issues that can exist. I do need to emphasize though, that it isn't only in one direction. The problems exist on both sides, and it creates bad blood all around.

The best defense against bad security from a secadmin is the same as how to defend against bad security from a sysadmin. Education. Teach the secadmin how the system works, let the secadmin teach the sysadmin security, and don't presume that the secadmin doesn't know anything of value. Some rules seem crazy, but may exist as a compensating control to reduce the risk of a particular attack. A good secadmin will explain the problem they are trying to solve and let you try and come up with a new way to solve that problem that doesn't create a new, larger problem. Let the secadmin see the problems you are trying to solve.
Post by Jan Schaumann
Post by Doug Hughes
Password policies that enforce very explicit lists of things
On the topic of passwords: are the different aspects -- such as password
rotation, complexity, hashing algorithms, use of vs. non-password based
auth, SSO vs. different passwords for different things -- and the
threats they attempt to mitigate well understood by most system
administrators?
Do we teach junior sysadmins about these to a sufficient degree or is
this something they (have to) pick up along the way to becoming more
senior?
-Jan
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speed can multiply the distribution of information that we know to be
untrue." Edward R Murrow (1964)

Mark McCullough
***@gmail.com




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Michael Tiernan
2014-12-21 21:02:44 UTC
Permalink
On 12/4/14 11:54 PM, Mark McCullough wrote:> I've met too many senior
sysadmins who still espouse the same nonsense about authentication I've
seen for years, and it's still wrong.
Post by Mark McCullough
Security is sufficiently specialized that no sysadmin can be
expected to know more than the basics.
Amen! Thank god someone says it.
Post by Mark McCullough
The best defense against bad security from a secadmin is the same as
how to defend against bad security from a sysadmin. Education. Teach
the secadmin how the system works,
As well as educating all parties involved that it is a sign of strength
and quality of person to be willing to admit as well as being able to
say "I don't know." and not a negative reflection on the person saying it.

I find it a point of pride that I can stand in front of people and say
"I don't know enough to do it safely, so I'm turning to [parties] to get
it done right."

Educating us not just about things we need to know but educating us to
recognize and admit to the things we don't know is important.
--
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Women and cats will do as they please, and men and dogs
should relax and get used to the idea. -Robert A. Heinlein
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Brandon Allbery
2014-12-21 21:16:08 UTC
Permalink
Post by Michael Tiernan
I find it a point of pride that I can stand in front of people and say
"I don't know enough to do it safely, so I'm turning to [parties] to get
it done right."
This can also be phrased positively: "part of my job is to know enough
about something to know who to contact to get it fixed".
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Mark R Lindsey
2014-12-03 15:59:34 UTC
Permalink
The internal security audits are a sham. Here are two examples:

At Banks: "We must have a physical firewall to pass the audit." Then the audit is performed by a former CPA who doesn't even review the configuration on that firewall. You can have a firewall with a default-allow policy that passes. But if you have server-based firewalls (e.g., iptables) on EVERY server, then that doesn't count for anything.

Another example, done at some US government networks: We have to update all the software on any box that was originally installed as Linux...UNLESS it's an embedded Linux in a product. In the case of Linux-used-as-core-of-another-product, then the product basically gets a pass on security reviews.
Post by Jan Schaumann
Hello,
I'm currently exploring the intersection of #sysadmin / #infosec[1] a
bit. There is obvious overlap, yet at many companies the two camps also
What #infosec or (PCI) compliance mandates and rules drive you nuts?
What (seemingly or actually) pointless, braindead things are demanded of
you?[2]
On the flip side, what are some of the security related concepts or
fundamentals that you think junior sysadmins are frequently lacking or
having trouble understanding?[3]
Feel free to email me off-list, if you prefer. Alternatively, you can
also reply to the tweets referenced.
Thanks in advance!
-Jan
[1] https://twitter.com/jschauma/status/540153322670661632
[2] https://twitter.com/jschauma/status/539626083583541249
[3] https://twitter.com/jschauma/status/539918484663062529
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Carolyn Rowland
2014-12-04 15:15:22 UTC
Permalink
It's these kinds of audits that distract sysadmins from the security that
actually makes things more secure. It drives a wedge between security
people and the sysadmins.

Carolyn
Post by Mark R Lindsey
At Banks: "We must have a physical firewall to pass the audit." Then the
audit is performed by a former CPA who doesn't even review the
configuration on that firewall. You can have a firewall with a
default-allow policy that passes. But if you have server-based firewalls
(e.g., iptables) on EVERY server, then that doesn't count for anything.
Another example, done at some US government networks: We have to update
all the software on any box that was originally installed as Linux...UNLESS
it's an embedded Linux in a product. In the case of
Linux-used-as-core-of-another-product, then the product basically gets a
pass on security reviews.
Post by Jan Schaumann
Hello,
I'm currently exploring the intersection of #sysadmin / #infosec[1] a
bit. There is obvious overlap, yet at many companies the two camps also
What #infosec or (PCI) compliance mandates and rules drive you nuts?
What (seemingly or actually) pointless, braindead things are demanded of
you?[2]
On the flip side, what are some of the security related concepts or
fundamentals that you think junior sysadmins are frequently lacking or
having trouble understanding?[3]
Feel free to email me off-list, if you prefer. Alternatively, you can
also reply to the tweets referenced.
Thanks in advance!
-Jan
[1] https://twitter.com/jschauma/status/540153322670661632
[2] https://twitter.com/jschauma/status/539626083583541249
[3] https://twitter.com/jschauma/status/539918484663062529
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leam hall
2014-12-04 15:28:28 UTC
Permalink
Post by Carolyn Rowland
It's these kinds of audits that distract sysadmins from the security that
actually makes things more secure. It drives a wedge between security people
and the sysadmins.
Carolyn
Yes and no. Keep in mind that security is one of the many skills a
sysadmin must have. Not everyone can or has made it a priority. So
auditable tasks become a minimal baseline for those that need it.

Once that's done, however, you've met the absolute bare bones "keep
your job" minimum. Then you start pulling in ideas from security
experts, using tools like Puppet, nmap, nessus, and continuous
improvement to harden your area.

Leam
--
Mind on a Mission
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Carolyn Rowland
2014-12-04 15:53:36 UTC
Permalink
I guess I've always seen security as a core skill for a sysadmin; it's
always been a priority. The auditor can be helpful by making me think about
areas where I haven't focused or can be like a cloud of black flies by
coming up with makework exercises.

Carolyn
Post by Mark McCullough
Post by Carolyn Rowland
It's these kinds of audits that distract sysadmins from the security that
actually makes things more secure. It drives a wedge between security
people
Post by Carolyn Rowland
and the sysadmins.
Carolyn
Yes and no. Keep in mind that security is one of the many skills a
sysadmin must have. Not everyone can or has made it a priority. So
auditable tasks become a minimal baseline for those that need it.
Once that's done, however, you've met the absolute bare bones "keep
your job" minimum. Then you start pulling in ideas from security
experts, using tools like Puppet, nmap, nessus, and continuous
improvement to harden your area.
Leam
--
Mind on a Mission
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leam hall
2014-12-04 15:59:11 UTC
Permalink
Post by Carolyn Rowland
I guess I've always seen security as a core skill for a sysadmin; it's
always been a priority. The auditor can be helpful by making me think about
areas where I haven't focused or can be like a cloud of black flies by
coming up with makework exercises.
Carolyn
Understood. Consider the "you" from X years ago; too much to learn at
once, often too little time to learn the basics, and often grumpy
people like me to deal with. That doesn't even begin to include
customers and users!

Leam
--
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Carolyn Rowland
2014-12-04 16:09:44 UTC
Permalink
So what's the best way to deal with this? A newbie sysadmin is going to be
overwhelmed by an overzealous auditor.

Carolyn
Post by leam hall
Post by Carolyn Rowland
I guess I've always seen security as a core skill for a sysadmin; it's
always been a priority. The auditor can be helpful by making me think
about
Post by Carolyn Rowland
areas where I haven't focused or can be like a cloud of black flies by
coming up with makework exercises.
Carolyn
Understood. Consider the "you" from X years ago; too much to learn at
once, often too little time to learn the basics, and often grumpy
people like me to deal with. That doesn't even begin to include
customers and users!
Leam
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leam hall
2014-12-04 16:12:17 UTC
Permalink
Post by Carolyn Rowland
So what's the best way to deal with this? A newbie sysadmin is going to be
overwhelmed by an overzealous auditor.
Carolyn
That's why people like me are in demand! Big, fuzzy, and grumpy. Most
auditors realize a check box isn't worth losing body parts over. :)

Leam
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Branson Matheson
2014-12-04 16:04:15 UTC
Permalink
</rant>

So as an auditor that's done plenty of banks, medical facilities.. what I have found is you see a very BROAD level of auditing capability and levels .. as outside of regulation most people are not encouraged to do or request more; and I believe that's because most auditors are seen as Evil(tm).

When I started.. the first instruction I tool on auditing, the instructor said something that's stuck with me for some time.. "If your customer doesn't say \"Yay, the auditor is here!\" .. then you're doing it wrong." This goes along with my other rants about how security and sysadmin should be working together. I swear I am gonna coin the idea of SecOps along side DevOps to encourage that. Anyway.

When you talk to a a potential auditor .. you really want to see if you can work with them instead of them merely working for you. Ask:

- Can I sit in with you as you're performing the audit? And watch/learn?
- Can I get copies of the tools you used?
- Can I get copies of any raw-reports?
- Would you mind using zsh | tee shell.log?

I believe it's probably a bit self-serving to be providing remediation as well as auditing in the same group ( kinda like lawyers working in congress.. but i digress ) .. however, if they have remediation recommendations.. you should certainly take advantage of them. Many tools give you that information in the raw output (CISecuriy Benchmarks for instance)

Your auditor should be someone you can depend on to help you improve state.. not just point out problems.

- b
I guess I've always seen security as a core skill for a sysadmin; it's always been a priority. The auditor can be helpful by making me think about areas where I haven't focused or can be like a cloud of black flies by coming up with makework exercises.
Carolyn
Post by Carolyn Rowland
It's these kinds of audits that distract sysadmins from the security that
actually makes things more secure. It drives a wedge between security people
and the sysadmins.
Carolyn
Yes and no. Keep in mind that security is one of the many skills a
sysadmin must have. Not everyone can or has made it a priority. So
auditable tasks become a minimal baseline for those that need it.
Once that's done, however, you've met the absolute bare bones "keep
your job" minimum. Then you start pulling in ideas from security
experts, using tools like Puppet, nmap, nessus, and continuous
improvement to harden your area.
Leam
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- b

Branson Matheson
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David Parter
2014-12-04 16:49:48 UTC
Permalink
Great advice on working with the auditor and making security a team
effort for everyone.
Post by Branson Matheson
Your auditor should be someone you can depend on to help you improve
state.. not just point out problems.
Unfortunately, from what I hear (we don't have these kinds of audits)
too many auditors don't even point our problems. Instead the give a list
of items that did not pass an arbitrary check-list that is not relevant
to the site, nor does it improve security.

A good auditor (of course) is using relevant standards and is willing to
work with the staff.

--david
Post by Branson Matheson
</rant>
So as an auditor that's done plenty of banks, medical facilities..
what I have found is you see a very BROAD level of auditing capability
and levels .. as outside of regulation most people are not encouraged
to do or request more; and I believe that's because most auditors are
seen as Evil(tm).
When I started.. the first instruction I tool on auditing, the
instructor said something that's stuck with me for some time.. "If
your customer doesn't say \"Yay, the auditor is here!\" .. then you're
doing it wrong." This goes along with my other rants about how
security and sysadmin should be working together. I swear I am gonna
coin the idea of SecOps along side DevOps to encourage that. Anyway.
When you talk to a a potential auditor .. you really want to see if
- Can I sit in with you as you're performing the audit? And watch/learn?
- Can I get copies of the tools you used?
- Can I get copies of any raw-reports?
- Would you mind using zsh | tee shell.log?
I believe it's probably a bit self-serving to be providing
remediation as well as auditing in the same group ( kinda like lawyers
working in congress.. but i digress ) .. however, if they have
remediation recommendations.. you should certainly take advantage of
them. Many tools give you that information in the raw output
(CISecuriy Benchmarks for instance)
Your auditor should be someone you can depend on to help you improve
state.. not just point out problems.
- b
Post by Carolyn Rowland
I guess I've always seen security as a core skill for a sysadmin;
it's always been a priority. The auditor can be helpful by making me
think about areas where I haven't focused or can be like a cloud of
black flies by coming up with makework exercises.
Carolyn
On Thu, Dec 4, 2014 at 10:15 AM, Carolyn Rowland
Post by Carolyn Rowland
It's these kinds of audits that distract sysadmins from the
security that
Post by Carolyn Rowland
actually makes things more secure. It drives a wedge between
security people
Post by Carolyn Rowland
and the sysadmins.
Carolyn
Yes and no. Keep in mind that security is one of the many skills a
sysadmin must have. Not everyone can or has made it a priority. So
auditable tasks become a minimal baseline for those that need it.
Once that's done, however, you've met the absolute bare bones "keep
your job" minimum. Then you start pulling in ideas from security
experts, using tools like Puppet, nmap, nessus, and continuous
improvement to harden your area.
Leam
--
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- b
Branson Matheson
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Elijah Wright
2014-12-04 17:59:26 UTC
Permalink
Great advice on working with the auditor and making security a team effort
for everyone.
Your auditor should be someone you can depend on to help you improve state..
not just point out problems.
Unfortunately, from what I hear (we don't have these kinds of audits) too
many auditors don't even point our problems. Instead the give a list of
items that did not pass an arbitrary check-list that is not relevant to the
site, nor does it improve security.
\

I've done several rounds with auditors who had no idea how "cloud"
(nay, even virtualization) or any services actually worked, and who
had to be educated as the process went along.

Is this common, or have I just been really unlucky across a number of years?

[My bias would be to prefer someone with a relatively current picture
of available technology and what is "normal-to-good" to someone who
last touched a server in the NT4 days....]

--e
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Jesse Becker
2014-12-04 18:06:24 UTC
Permalink
Post by Elijah Wright
I've done several rounds with auditors who had no idea how "cloud"
(nay, even virtualization) or any services actually worked, and who
had to be educated as the process went along.
I had to explain SSH to an ISSO about 7 years ago. That made my head
hurt in all sorts of ways.
--
Jesse Becker
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Edward Ned Harvey (lopser)
2014-12-05 02:14:23 UTC
Permalink
A good chef does not take a job at McDonald's. Someone who's good at security or a good sysadmin does not take a mind-numbingly repetitive job of periodically auditing/scanning customers for compliance and filling out an endless sea of checkboxes. Yet we all require these folks to scan/audit us quarterly. The end result is burger flippers coming into your kitchen with a dictatorial checklist, telling you the only correct way to cook pasta is to use salt and oil in the pot, while you the chef who knows better wants to use salt an no oil. But ultimately, they're the ones with the checklist that file the report that allows or disallows your company to get paid. The end result is brainlessly jumping through hoops to satisfy brainless requirements that usually include incorrect assumptions or premises, making uniformity the ultimate goal rather than security correctness.

<anecdotes>
<li>I inherited an IT dept that had an *actually* insecure PPTP vpn server facing the internet, with outdated firmware and a single user account that all users shared, using the company name as the password. I phased it out, in favor of a new cisco IPSec VPN server, with randomly generated 256-bit PSK, in aggressive mode. Failed PCI compliance test because aggressive mode + PSK, which could possibly be brute forced if PSK is weak. So I had to jump up and down write a letter, call three people, submit a form indicating please excuse us and justify the reasoning, we have an unguessable strong 256 bit randomly generated PSK, to get the scan to pass. And then the problem came back again next quarter. I would have to repeat the letter writing phone calling form filling procedure every quarter if I want to keep that IPSec VPN server up. Their dumb test procedure fails the stronger security solution and passes the actually insecure solution.</li>
<li>So I replaced that VPN with an SSL vpn, using startcom signed cert. Everyone in the world accepts startcom as a trusted CA, except our dumb PCI people. Compliance fail, we are required to use a different CA, because they're too dumb to care or do anything about updating their dumb scan script.</li>
<li>We had a godaddy wildcard cert available, so I used that. PCI fail, because they don't know what hostname we're using, and it's merely a wildcard cert, so their dumb script can't reverse-engineer and figure out our hostname from the cert subject, and they don't have any option for us to simply specify our hostname. They require our IP address to serve up a cert with subject whose forward dns results in our IP address. End result: Also cannot use wildcard cert, because they're too dumb.</li>
<li>So I had to go buy a new cert. Got it all up, got scans to pass. Next thing I know, POODLE comes out. So we disable SSLv3, we're now immune to POODLE. If any client tries to fallback to SSLv3, the firewall refuses to accept it - however unfortunately, cisco has not yet released the IOS version that *announces* the cipher suite without SSLv3 in it. So, PCI fail, due to POODLE. Their dumb script only checks what cipher suite we announce, and doesn't bother trying to actually establish an SSLv3 connection with us. Cisco TAC engineer is well aware of the problem, and informs me preemptively that we will still fail our PCI scan despite having SSLv3 disabled. Because they've heard this so many times already from other customers having the same stupid problems with the same stupid PCI auditors. The auditors cannot fix their scripts; instead Cisco TAC engineers inform customers that we need to contact the auditors and repeat the phone call & letter & form procedure to bu
y ourselves another 3 months, for cisco to release an updated version of IOS which can announce the cipher suite without SSLv3.</li>
</anecdotes>
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Edward Ned Harvey (lopser)
2014-12-05 02:32:14 UTC
Permalink
Post by Edward Ned Harvey (lopser)
I phased it out, in
favor of a new cisco IPSec VPN server, with randomly generated 256-bit PSK,
in aggressive mode.
Clarification: Aggressive mode, 256-bit PSK shared group authentication, in addition to individual username & password. (I just neglected to mention username & password in the sentence above, and felt the need to clarify that point.)
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Edward Ned Harvey (lopser)
2014-12-05 03:21:03 UTC
Permalink
Oh my dear god, I wanted to avoid this, but now I can't hold back the flood... Anecdotes follow.

I was once instructed to fill all the USB ports of all the computers with hot glue, except one port for keyboard and one port for mouse on each computer, and to install padlocks on all the computer chassis. At that particular company, outbound access to the internet was completely unregulated - you could very easily upload everything to China or Russia or wherever, using any protocol you like. There was also no countermeasure to USB hubs or simply living without the mouse or keyboard for a little while to make room for your USB storage device. I do not recall anymore, why exactly we didn't care about the optical drives - maybe they were all read-only? I forget. Anyway, I refused to do the hotglue thing (tried to engage discussion about what problem we're actually solving, and trying to solve it in some way that would be effective), and got fired a couple weeks later.

Later, I worked for a small company that got acquired by a big company. Small company is located inside an incubator, where the cleaning crew is provided by the incubator. Security folks of big company required us to install locking ethernet jack hole plugs and replace all our regular ethernet cables with locking ethernet cables to plug up each and every ethernet outlet, so the cleaning crew could not plug in a laptop. (Unless they have a butter knife strong enough to bend the plastic, or a smartphone capable of photographing the whiteboards, or a pair of wire snippers and knowledge of ethernet pinout).

Data closet was located in the incubator-provided datacenter on the 14th floor, behind cages which we were able to secure even against the incubator host company, who allowed us to change the locks and keep our own keys. Secure, that is, unless they have an ethernet cable at least 10 inches long and a stick and some duct tape, sufficient to reach right through the holes of the cage to plug an ethernet cable into the obviously visible and reachable switches.

Oh yeah. I mentioned we plugged up all the ethernet jacks of the 3rd floor, which go to a network closet on the 3rd floor, where we had to do the same cage-lock-changing shenanigans as the 14th floor. But the 3rd and 14th floors were connected to each other via fiber optic cable that ran through the incubator's duct work and conduit. Big company security folks *almost* required us to armor the fiber optic cable as a countermeasure to cutting & splicing, until I came up with the brilliant idea of enabling a VPN from our switches on the 3rd, to the switches on the 14th. So we built an on-premise LAN site-to-site VPN as an alternative to armored cables.

Same company, we were forced to disable all ssh servers in favor of telnet and ftp, so the traffic could be monitored. "Improved security." Because hey, otherwise they can't monitor the traffic to see what you're transferring from where to where. "Improved security."

We had some ubuntu servers, and we preferred to keep a local apt repository that we downloaded via rsync protocol. This is an outbound rsync connection, used to download files from the internet. New firewall blocked rsync port, and they denied our request to open outbound rsync protocol. Reason: rsync could be used to upload confidential information out of the company. Conclusion: Use http to download instead. (As if http couldn't be used to upload information out of the company.)

I probably have more, but I choose to quit now. I am currently laughing painfully. ;-) I wish these stories were untrue. I got fired from one company and quit the other because of these.
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p***@nym.hush.com
2014-12-06 07:01:30 UTC
Permalink
Hi Jan!

I like that you are doing your homework! That's a good thing :)

Now on to some various topics that should help you out a bit. If these
have been pointed out previously, just consider them confirmation on
that topic.
I didn't have time to read through all the responses.
1) Linux file system permissions as they pertain to webserver
functionality. In practice, it's great to have a layered security
approach. Granular permisisons can be burdensome. Especially with
resellers who like to have one user own a couple hundred wordpress
sites on a server.
That wouldn't be so bad, except every plugin they install will
eventually lead to an exploited server with hundreds of back doors and
shell scripts hidden in every nook and cranny. CMS based sites are
already inherently insecure, however with the correct user/permission
structure you can limit the blast radius. The webserver user
(www-data, apache, nobody) should never own the site. The webserver
only needs read-only permission to the site for it to run. All updates
should be carried out by an unprivileged user that owns the site.
Any directory that shouldn't have php rendered in it, should have an
.htaccess directive that prohibits it, image directories for example.
Always do a quick security assessment of newly provisioned servers and
review their filesystem permissions. Is /root world read/writable?
it's shouldn't be. Too often I see simple mistakes like this that can
cause quite a few issues for those who use control panel software like
cPanel. Get a program in place for hardening all newly provisioned
systems. I could go on forever about webserver/system security. So
I'll stop here.

2) Learn regex and some other scripting language(s) - you will use it.
(bash(required) - perl, python, c#, c++) and it makes you more
desirable.

3) When it comes to passwords - I've seen many opinions on this in the
responses you've gotten so I'll be brief. In many cases you can't opt
for SSO or 2 factor. I tend to encourage end users to pick pass
phrases if they must use a password. A passphrase should be multiple
terms/digits/special characters. A dictionary attack will generally
not be able to crack these. Avoid common phrases and memes.
"my2d0NkEy$***@s" Use a password manager software that will
generate random passwords if you can't remember them. LastPass or
something like that.

4) Keep a KB and/or if you have it a case/ticket system and write
things down in detail, because you will forget how you solved that one
issue 6 months to a year+ ago.

5) Most organizations get so tunnel-vision on the next great thing,
they tend to not keep up with updates/patches/maintenance for existing
infra. Don't fall into that habit. Help your organization develop a
maintenance program that will roll like clock-work once it's set up.
Set aside the time each month to ensure you get it done. This is a
compliance requirement!!!

6) Also ensure you audit and test your solutions to ensure they are
always doing what they were implemented to do. I can't stress it
enough - MONITOR EVERYTHING - use SNMP, use WMI, don't rely on PING
for downtime events. Rely on actual processes that enable the
functionality of the system. If those processes die due to whatever
reason and the system is still up - how long until you notice and
resolve? How many things were impacted? You can avoid not having these
answers by ensuring you have everything in your arsenal monitored and
acted on.

7) PCI - Don't offer information you don't have to. "Oh yeah we have
an IDS, we finally got it working after being down for 8 months"
Harvey Rothenberg
2014-12-18 23:34:08 UTC
Permalink
Post by Jan Schaumann
My biggest battle?  The false belief that every improvement to
security hurts usability and every improvement to usability hurts
security.  It is common in people who have been doing things long
enough they should know better, rather than just the newer people.
I think that's a very good and important point: the long-held beliefs by
(proudly grumpy) old-timers may well do more harm than any wide-eyed
naivete of junior people.
I would like to point out that Mark's beginning statement has been true, as it still is today, since companies have had DP/MIS/IT departments.  After many years working in this field, the real issue regarding this subject, is that the wrong priorities are stressed if you wish to have a more secure IT. 

Getting the App/Prog to market first (no matter what, attitude) is the wrong priority.  Security that is part of the foundation of whatever (Op Sys, App, Protocol, Service, etc.) will allow solutions for unseen problem to be more quickly resolved, if developed and tested properly.  Taking Short-cuts to get to market has not been the solution in the long run.  If the foundations are wrong then replace them with new ones and not by tacking on fixes.

An example of this would be Steve Jobs's choice to build his MAC Os upon a more securely built, than other OS's that he had a choice of at the time, was the right direction to take, and this has been proven over time.  I understand that it was FreeBSD.

I take offense to the implication that "grumpy old-timers" seem to be the roadblock.  The real issue are persons with Closed Minds.  These persons can be younger or older.  The technology of today, just like our science, is built upon the foundations from the working past, such as Virtual technology from mainframe days.  The working concepts just took the tech in another direction.  Is the concept really a brand new concept or just applied differently ? 

These are my views since starting in computers when I was a high school teenager and corporations were pretty much the only ones that needed and used computers.  I thank the list for letting me present a different view on the same issues.  I wish you ALL a Happy Holidays !
Sincerely,Harvey RothenbergSystems Integrator/Security Specialist
 “Science without religion is lame. Religion without science is blind.” Albert Einstein

On Saturday, December 6, 2014 2:37 AM, "***@nym.hush.com" <***@nym.hush.com> wrote:


Hi Jan!

I like that you are doing your homework! That's a good thing :)

Now on to some various topics that should help you out a bit. If these have been pointed out previously, just consider them confirmation on that topic.
I didn't have time to read through all the responses.


1) Linux file system permissions as they pertain to webserver functionality. In practice, it's great to have a layered security approach. Granular permisisons can be burdensome. Especially with resellers who like to have one user own a couple hundred wordpress sites on a server.
That wouldn't be so bad, except every plugin they install will eventually lead to an exploited server with hundreds of back doors and shell scripts hidden in every nook and cranny. CMS based sites are already inherently insecure, however with the correct user/permission structure you can limit the blast radius. The webserver user (www-data, apache, nobody) should never own the site. The webserver only needs read-only permission to the site for it to run. All updates should be carried out by an unprivileged user that owns the site.
Any directory that shouldn't have php rendered in it, should have an .htaccess directive that prohibits it, image directories for example.
Always do a quick security assessment of newly provisioned servers and review their filesystem permissions. Is /root world read/writable? it's shouldn't be. Too often I see simple mistakes like this that can cause quite a few issues for those who use control panel software like cPanel. Get a program in place for hardening all newly provisioned systems.  I could go on forever about webserver/system security. So I'll stop here.

2) Learn regex and some other scripting language(s) - you will use it. (bash(required) - perl, python, c#, c++) and it makes you more desirable.

3) When it comes to passwords - I've seen many opinions on this in the responses you've gotten so I'll be brief. In many cases you can't opt for SSO or 2 factor. I tend to encourage end users to pick pass phrases if they must use a password. A passphrase should be multiple terms/digits/special characters. A dictionary attack will generally not be able to crack these. Avoid common phrases and memes. "my2d0NkEy$***@s" Use a password manager software that will generate random passwords if you can't remember them. LastPass or something like that.

4) Keep a KB and/or if you have it a case/ticket system and write things down in detail, because you will forget how you solved that one issue 6 months to a year+ ago.

5) Most organizations get so tunnel-vision on the next great thing, they tend to not keep up with updates/patches/maintenance for existing infra. Don't fall into that habit. Help your organization develop a maintenance program that will roll like clock-work once it's set up. Set aside the time each month to ensure you get it done. This is a compliance requirement!!!

6) Also ensure you audit and test your solutions to ensure they are always doing what they were implemented to do. I can't stress it enough - MONITOR EVERYTHING - use SNMP, use WMI, don't rely on PING for downtime events. Rely on actual processes that enable the functionality of the system. If those processes die due to whatever reason and the system is still up - how long until you notice and resolve? How many things were impacted? You can avoid not having these answers by ensuring you have everything in your arsenal monitored and acted on.

7) PCI - Don't offer information you don't have to. "Oh yeah we have an IDS, we finally got it working after being down for 8 months" <-- avoid that. Generally, the QSA won't care, but if you happen to get the one who does - he'll see it as a red flag and start digging deeper for more evidence in everything else and make your life more difficult. Just say "Yes we have IDS." You want them in and out. If you do have issues with something that could ding your compliance, be freaking honest. "This system is not patched right now because we have a particular mission critical application that will break if we do. But we are working on phasing it out/updating. We monitor all logs, employ the use of FIM, and access is strictly controlled via SDN/WAF/FIREWALL/ACLs/ etc.." This answer is more acceptable than "This system isn't patched and there's nothing we can do about it"

8) For PCI or SSA16, you need evidence. So collect it on a regular basis. Quarterly works. Have a central repository set up and dump your evidence in there. This will range from reports to screenshots. This way you aren't scrambling to provide it at the time of assessment.

9) Don't be afraid of breaking stuff. Cause you will, and you will learn from it. If you avoid doing particular things at work because you are worried about screwing up - you won't get anywhere. If you are absolutely unsure, simply ask. There's no harm in asking. Make mistakes (unintentional of course), if you are in an organization that hangs you out to dry over a mistake - then you are in the wrong organization. It's processes and controls that should be evaluated when mistakes are made. It could be a training issue, but in other cases it is usually the process that is broken.

10 ) Understand the workflow and how every solution interacts with your traffic/data. This will help you to better troubleshoot and identify everything that touches that data from point a to point b within your network.


Hopefully some of this hits a chord and helps you in your endeavors. I wish you the best!

Alicia

On 12/3/2014 at 9:48 AM, "Jan Schaumann" <***@netmeister.org> wrote:
Hello,

I'm currently exploring the intersection of #sysadmin / #infosec[1] a
bit. There is obvious overlap, yet at many companies the two camps also
frequently end up at loggerheads. I'd like to collect some feedback:

What #infosec or (PCI) compliance mandates and rules drive you nuts?
What (seemingly or actually) pointless, braindead things are demanded of
you?[2]

On the flip side, what are some of the security related concepts or
fundamentals that you think junior sysadmins are frequently lacking or
having trouble understanding?[3]

Feel free to email me off-list, if you prefer. Alternatively, you can
also reply to the tweets referenced.

Thanks in advance!
-Jan

[1] https://twitter.com/jschauma/status/540153322670661632
[2] https://twitter.com/jschauma/status/539626083583541249
[3] https://twitter.com/jschauma/status/539918484663062529

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Brandon Allbery
2014-12-18 23:45:23 UTC
Permalink
Post by Harvey Rothenberg
An example of this would be Steve Jobs's choice to build his MAC Os upon a
more securely built, than other OS's that he had a choice of at the time,
was the right direction to take, and this has been proven over time. I
understand that it was FreeBSD.
<pedantry>
Sort of. It's an updated CMU Mach; where Mach used one of the 4.2BSD
releases for its hosted OS base, XNU uses FreeBSD-Current. But, as with
Mach's 4.2BSD, it is modified --- significantly, in its core --- because it
is a guest under XNU.
</pedantry>
--
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***@gmail.com ***@sinenomine.net
unix, openafs, kerberos, infrastructure, xmonad http://sinenomine.net
David Lang
2014-12-19 00:23:41 UTC
Permalink
Post by Jan Schaumann
I'm currently exploring the intersection of #sysadmin / #infosec[1] a
bit. There is obvious overlap, yet at many companies the two camps also
frequently end up at loggerheads. I'd like to collect some feedback
I've been doing infosec for the last 20 years, and doing a lot of sysadmin work
along the way.

The biggest reason for the two groups to end up at loggerheads is just different
priorities and resource contraints.

If security has to tell ops to do something, and then ops has to figure out how
to do it on top of all the work they already have to do (which almost always
already exceeds the manpower available by a significant amount) they are going
to be grumpy. It's especially bad if their bonuses depend on them completing
their assigned work, and that assigned work doesn't allow for the security
issues.

The security folks get grumpy because they don't see problems getting fixed.



All to frequently, security people end up taking a "do what I say, not what I
do" approach to things. This is a pet peeve of mine. 'pentest experts' in
particular tend to take the attitude that the rules don't apply to them if they
can figure a way around them

Many times ops people resist improving the security of anything because there is
some other way to get it (they don't get the idea of fixing some things now and
other things later)



In good organizations, the security people live by the rules that they set, and
there is time set aside in the schedule planning to be able to do security work.
The best sysadmins understand security and the best security people understand
operations, but such people are rare. The most important thing is the ability
for the two sides to talk and disagree on the priority of things. If either side
can override the other at will, it's going to be a disaster.


It's valuable to have the two teams report to different management (for example:
if security reports to the ops manager who's bonus is based on service uptime,
security concerns are likely to get low priority until there is an incident that
causes an outage), but this split just emphisises the difference in priorities.
This can be especially troublesome if the security group reports to management
that doesn't understand the technology (reporting to legal is common, and senior
lawyers aren't likely to be keeping up to date on datacenter technology)

David Lang
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Harvey Rothenberg
2014-12-19 01:21:39 UTC
Permalink
Dear Mr. Brandon Allbery,
I thank you for your attention to detail and your correction. 

Sincerely,Harvey Rothenberg
Post by Jan Schaumann
I'm currently exploring the intersection of #sysadmin / #infosec[1] a
bit.  There is obvious overlap, yet at many companies the two camps also
frequently end up at loggerheads.  I'd like to collect some feedback
I've been doing infosec for the last 20 years, and doing a lot of sysadmin work
along the way.

The biggest reason for the two groups to end up at loggerheads is just different
priorities and resource contraints.

If security has to tell ops to do something, and then ops has to figure out how
to do it on top of all the work they already have to do (which almost always
already exceeds the manpower available by a significant amount) they are going
to be grumpy. It's especially bad if their bonuses depend on them completing
their assigned work, and that assigned work doesn't allow for the security
issues.

The security folks get grumpy because they don't see problems getting fixed.



All to frequently, security people end up taking a "do what I say, not what I
do" approach to things. This is a pet peeve of mine. 'pentest experts' in
particular tend to take the attitude that the rules don't apply to them if they
can figure a way around them

Many times ops people resist improving the security of anything because there is
some other way to get it (they don't get the idea of fixing some things now and
other things later)



In good organizations, the security people live by the rules that they set, and
there is time set aside in the schedule planning to be able to do security work.
The best sysadmins understand security and the best security people understand
operations, but such people are rare. The most important thing is the ability
for the two sides to talk and disagree on the priority of things. If either side
can override the other at will, it's going to be a disaster.


It's valuable to have the two teams report to different management (for example:
if security reports to the ops manager who's bonus is based on service uptime,
security concerns are likely to get low priority until there is an incident that
causes an outage), but this split just emphisises the difference in priorities.
This can be especially troublesome if the security group reports to management
that doesn't understand the technology (reporting to legal is common, and senior
lawyers aren't likely to be keeping up to date on datacenter technology)

David Lang
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Jan Schaumann
2014-12-19 15:36:10 UTC
Permalink
Post by Jan Schaumann
On the flip side, what are some of the security related concepts or
fundamentals that you think junior sysadmins are frequently lacking or
having trouble understanding?
Thanks to everybody who replied. There was a lot of good feedback here.

I used some of the information gathered here when trying to identify
which general concepts are sometimes misunderstood or not known by
junior people, and I've tried to explain some of them here:

http://sysadvent.blogspot.com/2014/12/day-20-infosec-basics-reason-behind.html

There's much more to be covered, and a flip-side discussion of what
infosec people are missing would be well warranted, but either way,
thanks again for the discussion.

-Jan
Dan Schlitt
2014-12-19 16:52:26 UTC
Permalink
Who minds the office?

Is the address on the web site correct?

Early this year I mailed a check for my dues to the address on the web
site. It didn't come back but it was never cashed.

Eventually I concluded that it was lost in the mail and sent another check
with a note to the address on the web site. So far there has been the same
result.

Who is minding the stor?

/dan

Member Number 311


--
Dan Schlitt
***@theworld.com


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Evan Pettrey
2014-12-19 17:05:38 UTC
Permalink
Hey Dan,

Do you know what address you sent the check to? I'm no longer on the board
but if you sent it to a Maryland address that would have been me. However,
I was quite good about processing checks and I don't recall ever seeing one
come through for you.

If you sent it to a PO Box in New Jersey that'd be LOPSA's corporate
address which I can't speak to as I'm not in that location.


As I did not run for reelection after my two year term I'm not sure where
checks are sent these days!


Hope this helps.


Best,
Evan
Post by Dan Schlitt
Who minds the office?
Is the address on the web site correct?
Early this year I mailed a check for my dues to the address on the web
site. It didn't come back but it was never cashed.
Eventually I concluded that it was lost in the mail and sent another check
with a note to the address on the web site. So far there has been the same
result.
Who is minding the stor?
/dan
Member Number 311
--
Dan Schlitt
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Dan Schlitt
2014-12-19 17:14:03 UTC
Permalink
It was the NJ address. That is the one that is on the page listing the
officers.

/dan

--
Dan Schlitt
Post by Evan Pettrey
Hey Dan,
Do you know what address you sent the check to? I'm no longer on the board
but if you sent it to a Maryland address that would have been me. However,
I was quite good about processing checks and I don't recall ever seeing one
come through for you.
If you sent it to a PO Box in New Jersey that'd be LOPSA's corporate
address which I can't speak to as I'm not in that location.
As I did not run for reelection after my two year term I'm not sure where
checks are sent these days!
Hope this helps.
Best,
Evan
Post by Dan Schlitt
Who minds the office?
Is the address on the web site correct?
Early this year I mailed a check for my dues to the address on the web
site. It didn't come back but it was never cashed.
Eventually I concluded that it was lost in the mail and sent another check
with a note to the address on the web site. So far there has been the same
result.
Who is minding the stor?
/dan
Member Number 311
--
Dan Schlitt
_______________________________________________
Discuss mailing list
https://lists.lopsa.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/discuss
This list provided by the League of Professional System Administrators
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Discuss mailing list
***@lists.lopsa.org
https://lists.lopsa.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/discuss
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Ski Kacoroski
2014-12-19 17:23:05 UTC
Permalink
Dan,

I am looking into what happened here and will let you know what I find out.

cheers,

ski
Post by Dan Schlitt
It was the NJ address. That is the one that is on the page listing the
officers.
/dan
--
Dan Schlitt
Post by Evan Pettrey
Hey Dan,
Do you know what address you sent the check to? I'm no longer on the board
but if you sent it to a Maryland address that would have been me. However,
I was quite good about processing checks and I don't recall ever seeing one
come through for you.
If you sent it to a PO Box in New Jersey that'd be LOPSA's corporate
address which I can't speak to as I'm not in that location.
As I did not run for reelection after my two year term I'm not sure where
checks are sent these days!
Hope this helps.
Best,
Evan
Post by Dan Schlitt
Who minds the office?
Is the address on the web site correct?
Early this year I mailed a check for my dues to the address on the web
site. It didn't come back but it was never cashed.
Eventually I concluded that it was lost in the mail and sent another check
with a note to the address on the web site. So far there has been the same
result.
Who is minding the stor?
/dan
Member Number 311
--
Dan Schlitt
_______________________________________________
Discuss mailing list
https://lists.lopsa.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/discuss
This list provided by the League of Professional System Administrators
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--
"When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it
connected to the entire universe" John Muir

Chris "Ski" Kacoroski, ***@lopsa.org, 206-501-9803
or ski98033 on most IM services
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Dan Schlitt
2015-01-15 16:17:54 UTC
Permalink
Ski,

What did you find out?

I waited for the bank statement to see if the checkcleared. It didn't. My
calendar says that is about time to send in my membership renewal for
2015. I won't do it until this gets straightened out.

Waiting.

/dan


--
Dan Schlitt
Post by Ski Kacoroski
Dan,
I am looking into what happened here and will let you know what I find out.
cheers,
ski
Post by Dan Schlitt
It was the NJ address. That is the one that is on the page listing the
officers.
/dan
--
Dan Schlitt
Post by Evan Pettrey
Hey Dan,
Do you know what address you sent the check to? I'm no longer on the board
but if you sent it to a Maryland address that would have been me. However,
I was quite good about processing checks and I don't recall ever seeing one
come through for you.
If you sent it to a PO Box in New Jersey that'd be LOPSA's corporate
address which I can't speak to as I'm not in that location.
As I did not run for reelection after my two year term I'm not sure where
checks are sent these days!
Hope this helps.
Best,
Evan
Post by Dan Schlitt
Who minds the office?
Is the address on the web site correct?
Early this year I mailed a check for my dues to the address on the web
site. It didn't come back but it was never cashed.
Eventually I concluded that it was lost in the mail and sent another check
with a note to the address on the web site. So far there has been the same
result.
Who is minding the stor?
/dan
Member Number 311
--
Dan Schlitt
_______________________________________________
Discuss mailing list
https://lists.lopsa.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/discuss
This list provided by the League of Professional System Administrators
http://lopsa.org/
_______________________________________________
Discuss mailing list
https://lists.lopsa.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/discuss
This list provided by the League of Professional System Administrators
http://lopsa.org/
--
"When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it
connected to the entire universe" John Muir
or ski98033 on most IM services
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